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Management Compensation and Firm-Level Income Inequality
*
 
In recent decades, most developed countries have experienced a simultaneous increase in 
income inequality and management compensation. In this paper, we study the relation 
between management compensation and firm-level income dynamics in a general equilibrium 
model. Empirical estimation, of the model’s key parameters show that the rising management 
premium is indeed the main driving force behind the observed increase in income inequality. 
This is the case even when other potential sources such as technological progress and skill-
biased technological change are taken into account. We also show that a rising management 
premium produces income distribution dynamics at the firm level which are similar to those 
observed at the market level, i.e. rising income inequality overall as well as within and 
between education groups. 
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In recent decades, most developed countries have experienced increasing in-
come inequality (OECD, 2007). At the same time, management compen-
sation has risen sharply, see Abowd and Bognanno (1995), Murphy (1999),
and Piketty and Saez (2006). In this paper, we investigate the consequences
of rising management compensation for ﬁrm-level income inequality. Our
main ﬁnding is that a rising management premium produces income distri-
bution dynamics at the ﬁrm-level that are similar to those observed more
generally at the market level.1 That is, a higher management premium in-
creases both within- and between-education group income inequality, besides
adding to overall income dispersion. We also show that alternative sources to
increasing income inequality such as technological progress and skill-biased
technological change are unable to produce similar income distribution dy-
namics.
We investigate the link between management compensation and income
inequality using a general equilibrium framework similar to Pissarides (1994).
Our analysis follows Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Gautier (2002). Al-
brecht and Vroman explore an economy with heterogeneous workers and
jobs. A key aspect of their model is that jobs have skill requirements. This
implies that low-skilled individuals are unproductive in jobs requiring high
skills. In contrast, highly skilled workers can take a job of any type but
they are more productive in jobs requiring high skills. Mis-matched workers
do not search for better jobs. The model in Gautier (2002) is similar to
Albrecht and Vroman but Gautier allows highly educated employees to per-
form on-the-job search. Our model can be seen as an extension of Gautier
(2002) in that we allow both low and high-educated employees to perform
on-the-job search. This extension is important because we can use it to
explain the empirical observation that there is a skill mix in all job types,
i.e. low- and highly-educated employees work in both the management and
non-management sector of the ﬁrm. This has important implications for the
income distribution.
We estimate the model’s key parameters using seven years of monthly
personnel records (1997 to 2003) from the main production site of an inter-
national pharmaceutical company. The advantage of these data compared
to traditional labor market data sets is that the data contains information
on job assignment, that is, if the worker is employed in management or non-
management. This additional information is important because it allows us
1See Autor and Katz (1999) and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005) for a detailed dis-
cussion of the income distribution at the market level and decomposition methods.
2to identify the rapidly growing management premium as the source of the
increasing ﬁrm-level income inequality overall as well as within- and between-
education groups. This result cannot be identiﬁed using conventional labor
market data.
Our empirical analysis also assists in identifying technological progress
and management-biased technological progress (i.e. technology shocks in-
creasing the relative productivity of management employees) as empirically
important. In contrast, our analysis questions the empirical importance of
skill-biased technological change. The reason is that the change in the income
gap between highly- and low-educated employees, conditional on the changes
in the management premium, is insigniﬁcant. However, unconditionally the
between-education group income gap is increasing, but this only reﬂects that
highly educated employees have a higher representation in management and
therefore are more likely to harvest the increasing management premium.
Overall, the technology shocks have implications for the equilibrium income
distribution. Technological progress increases income for all employees and
thereby shifts the income distribution to the right, whereas management-
biased technological progress only increases income for managers. Thus we
can identify the growing management premium as the source of the increasing
income inequality observed in the ﬁrm.
The information on job assignment that we use to identify the central role
of the management premium for the observed increase in income inequality
comes at a cost; namely the limitation to one ﬁrm. For this reason, we do
not claim that our empirical results are representative for the economy. But
our ﬁndings show that rising management compensation is a prime candidate
for explaining the observed increase in income inequality at the market level
because of the income distribution dynamics it creates at the ﬁrm-level, such
as the ability to increase both within- and between-group income inequality.
Ourﬁndings complement other research onthe income distribution. Piketty
and Saez (2006) ﬁnd that top income shares are rising in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Canada from the mid-1980s. They also docu-
ment that the increase is mainly a labor income phenomenon and not due to
business or capital income. Other papers such as Murphy (1999) Hall and
Murphy (2003), Murphy and Zábojník (2004 and 2007) and Frydman (2005)
focus on CEO compensation in the United States and report similar ﬁndings.
Our results show that to understand the changes in the income distribution,
focus should be broadened beyond CEOs as it is the earnings progression of
managers (and not just the CEO) that drives the increasing income inequal-
ity. This result is important because it stresses that the structure of the ﬁrm
should be modelled when studying changes in the income distribution.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present the
3theoretical model and the equilibriumis established in Section 3. In Section 4,
we present the data and document preliminary evidence of the changes in the
income distribution. We present the empirical results in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 summarizes and concludes. Proofs and additional regressions are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a ﬁrm with a management (M) and non-management (N) sector
that faces a labor force of Ξ workers. The workers employed by the ﬁrm are
members of the internal labor market denoted by I, the remaining individuals
constitute the external labor force, E. The size of the total labor force is
normalized to unity, i.e. Ξ = I + E = 1. All workers are distinguished by
an observable level of education where the proportion π of the workers is
low-educated and the remaining 1 − π is highly-educated. Highly-educated
workers will be referred to as H-workers while low-educated workers will
be referred to as L-workers. We shall use the notation k ∈ {H,L} and
j ∈ {N,M}.
When the ﬁrm opens up a vacancy, the type is determined ex-ante. Thus,
the job search behavior is as follows. First, for reasons explained below,
individuals have the highest productivity in management jobs. This im-
plies that employees with the required level of education from both the
non-management part of the internal labor market (ikN) and the external
labor market (ek) apply for management vacancies (vk). Second, employ-
ees currently working in management (ikM) have no incentives to search for
a new job, hence only individuals in the external labor market search for
non-management vacancies (vN).
Workers and vacancies meet each other randomly according to a matching
function that is increasing in its argument, concave, and homogenous of
degree 1. The matching processes between jobs and workers in management
are represented by
xkM = xkM(vk,ek + ikN) = (vk)
α(ek + ikN)
1−α,
and in non-management by
xN = xN(vN,eL + eH) = (vN)
α(eL + eH)
1−α.
The labor market ﬂows are illustrated in Figure 1. Individuals in the
external labor market search for both non-management and management














Figure 1: Flow diagram
of the ﬁrm, he has an option to be promoted. Since jobs in management
have education requirements, both low- and highly-educated employees are
promoted. All employees have an exogenous separation risk, hence there are
ﬂows from both the management and non-management sector back into the
external labor market.
A worker’s output is denoted by ykj. We make two assumptions about
the workers productivity. First, highly-educated workers are more produc-
tive than low-educated workers because schooling gives the workers a higher
production capacity. Second, we assume, as do Lucas (1978) and Rosen
(1982) that workers in non-management jobs have limited discretion over re-
sources and hence are less productive than employees in management jobs
who control resources. Thus yLN < yHN < yLM < yHM.
















The terms θk and θN represent labor market tightness and are deﬁned as:
θk = vk/(ek + ikN) and θN = vN/(eL + eH). Similarly, we denote the prob-
ability that a worker of type k encounters a vacancy of type k by pkM and










2.1 Payoﬀ Functions and Wage Determination
The ﬁrm maximizes the present discounted value (PDV) of expected proﬁts
and the individual maximizes the PDV of the expected income stream. The
ﬁrm decides if a particular vacancy should be opened or not. The individual
assesses if the job oﬀer received is suﬃciently attractive given the alternative
options such as other employment or continued job search. When the worker
and the ﬁrm meet, they bargain over the wage. In the following, we describe
these processes.
2.1.1 The Firm
The ﬁrmadvertises three diﬀerent types of jobs: a vacancy in non-management
and two vacancies in management. These require diﬀerent levels of education.
Since the non-management vacancy can be ﬁlled with a worker of any educa-
tion level, the ﬁrm will in practice employ up to four diﬀerent employee types:
low-educated in non-management, highly-educated in non-management, low-
educated in management, and highly-educated in management. These types
generate diﬀerent levels of proﬁts since they diﬀer in their productivities and
- as will be shown below - diﬀerent costs.
Let us denote the expected PDV of having a vacant non-management job
by VN. The expected PDV of the vacancy depends on the potential worker’s
productivity. For this reason, we denote the PDV of a vacancy ﬁlled with an
employee of type k by JkN.
Under perfect competition the valuation of a vacant non-management job
is such that the cost rVN (where r is the discount rate) equals the rate of
return. Recalling that the job is ﬁlled by a highly-educated or a low-educated
worker with probability qN, the rate of return can be written as the diﬀerence
between the cost of the vacant non-management job, cN, and the expected
average return generated by having the job ﬁlled. The average return from
having a low-educated or a highly-educated worker in the job is equal to
the sum of the returns generated by low-educated workers and the returns
generated by highly-educated workers, weighted by the relative population








Using the same intuition, the valuation of a non-management job ﬁlled by a
worker of type k can be written such that the cost, rJkN, equals the return.
In this case, the return is the output produced by the worker, ykN, minus
wkN, the wage paid to the worker. In addition to this, the eventual loss
of revenues that occur if the worker and the ﬁrm separate, which happens
with probability s, and the potential loss if the worker ﬁnds a job in the
management sector must be added. We therefore have
rJkN = ykN − wkN + s(VN − JkN) + pkM(VN − JkN). (2)
We can now derive the remaining expected PDVs for the ﬁrm in the same
way. The expected income streams of the management vacancies, VkM, are:
rVkM = qkM(JkM − VkM) − ckM, (3)
where ckM are the vacancy costs.
Finally, the expected proﬁt from recruiting a worker of type k to a man-
agement job, JkM, is given by:
rJkM = ykM − wkM + s(VkM − JkM), (4)
where wkM is the wages paid to an employee of type k working in manage-
ment.
2.1.2 The Worker
A worker of type k earns wkN when employed in non-management and wkM
when working in management. For simplicity, we normalize an employee’s
income in the external labor market to zero.
Let Ek be the present discounted value of the expected income stream for
a type k worker in the external labor market. The individual may move to
a job either in non-management or in management. The ﬁrst event occurs
with probability pN. The worker would then earn the present discounted
value of the expected income stream WkN until a job in management arrives
or a separation from the ﬁrm occurs. If the individual instead gets a job
in management (which occurs with probability pkM), the present discounted
value of the expected income stream is WkM until separation. In sum, Ek is
equal to the expected gain from a change of state:
rEk = pN(WkN − Ek) + pkM(WkM − Ek). (5)
7The payoﬀ to a worker in non-management, WkN, is given by the wage, wkN,
the risk premium against separation, and the option value of being promoted:
rWkN = wkN + s(Ek − WkN) + pkM(WkM − WkN), (6)
where WkM is the expected income stream in a management job.
Employees already working in management do not search for a new job,
but they face the separation risk, s. Thus, the payoﬀ to a management job is
rWkM = wkM + s(Ek − WkM). (7)
2.1.3 Wage Determination
Wages are determined by Nash bargaining where a proportion of the match
value (0 < β < 1) is allocated to the worker and the remaining part to the
ﬁrm. We follow Gautier (2002) and assume the following employee disagree-
ment payoﬀs:
rDkN = s(Ek − DkN) + pkM(WkM − DkN), (8)
where DkN is the disagreement payoﬀ for employees in the external labor
market bargaining for a non-management job. The disagreement payoﬀs
capture two important aspects. First, negotiation may fail (with probability
s), in which case the employee returns to the external labor market and earns
Ek. Second, while bargaining for a non-management job, the worker may
ﬁnd a more attractive job in management (with probability pkM) and thus
receive the payoﬀassociated with a management jobs WkM. The disagreement
payoﬀs for workers bargaining for a management job are similar:
rDkM = s(Ek − DkM).
3 Equilibrium
We derive the steady state equilibrium by imposing two assumptions. First,
the labor market ﬂows are stable and the ﬂow of a particular employee type
into a sector equals the ﬂow out. Second, all proﬁt opportunities in the
market are exhausted. That is, VN = 0 and VkM = 0. The equilibrium is
derived in the Appendix and the equilibrium income distribution is presented
in Proposition (1).
Proposition 1 In equilibrium:
a) Wages are proportional to productivity: wk,j = βyk,j
b) The income distribution is: w = wk,j with probability ik,j/I
8Proof. See the Appendix.
3.1 Interpretation
Technology shocks alter the equilibrium income distribution. In this section,
we discuss the consequences of technological progress, skill-biased techno-
logical change, and management-biased technological change (i.e. a shock
which alters the relative productivity of management employees) for income
inequality. We also propose an empirical strategy for identiﬁcation of the
various shocks. Our empirical ﬁndings (presented in the next section) show
that while technological progress shifts the income distribution right, the
observed increase in income inequality is explained by management-biased
technological progress because it increases the management premium, and
hence widens the income distribution. Further, skill-biased technological
progress empirically plays an insigniﬁcant role.
To advance our understanding of the changes in income inequality, note
ﬁrst that in Proposition 1 wages are proportional to productivity. Thus,
using the wage of low-educated employees in the non-management sector as
the reference group and denoting their wages as wLN = βyLN = βy, we can
write wHN = βµ1y, wLM = βµ2y and wHM = βµ3y, where the productivity
























Using the (µ,y)-notation, it follows that income inequality within the
group of low-educated employees is wLM/wLN = µ2 and within the group of
highly educated employees it is wHM/wHN = µ3/µ1. It can also be estab-
lished that income inequality between highly and low-educated employees
increases in µ1 and µ3 but decreases in µ2. This implies that management-
biased technological progress (i.e. an increase in µ2 and µ3) leads to higher
within-education group inequality. Further, because the management sector
empirically is dominated by highly educated employees, management-biased
technology progress increases between-education group income inequality.
9Alternatively, skill-biased technological progress increasing the relative pro-
ductivity or highly educated employees (i.e. µ1 and µ3) clearly increases
between-education group income inequality but has no eﬀect on within-group
inequality. Finally, technological progress increasing y has no consequences
for within- and between-education group income inequality.
Deﬁnition 1 (Technology shocks):
1) Technological progress increases the productivity of all employees equally
2) Skill-biased technological progress increases the relative productivity of
highly educated employees relatively to low-educated employees
3) Management-biased technological progress increases the relative productiv-
ity of managers relative to non-management employees.
An important implication of the derived relation between relative wages
and productivity is that the employees’ relative productivity can be estimated











where 1(.) is an indicator function, a is a constant, t and X control for time
and other factors, $ is an error term, and δ and the µ￿s are parameters.
The point estimates obtained from the regression can be used to predict
the expected log-wages for the diﬀerent employee subgroups. For instance,
ln ˆ wLNt = ˆ α + ˆ t + X￿















= lnµ1t ⇔ lnwHNt − lnwLNt = lnµ1t. (11)
Hence, combining equations (10) and (11) we get
ˆ µ
∗
1t = lnµ1t ⇔ µ1t = exp(ˆ µ
∗
1t).
Furthermore, note that ln ˆ wLNt+1 − ln ˆ wLNt = t. Similar links can be made
between the model’s remaining parameters and the Mincer equation. Thus,
regression (9) can be used to identify the technology shocks and therefore be
used to identify the driving forces behind the observed changes in the income
distribution.
104 The Data
Seven years of monthly personnel records from the main production size of
an international pharmaceutical company are used in the empirical analysis.
The average employment in the ﬁrm over the period 1997 to 2003 is 6175
persons, and the share of management workers in the ﬁrm is close to 4 per-
cent.2 The promotion probability is almost 2 percent per year and the yearly
separation rate is 3.5 percent.
The full data set consists of 519,016 observations. These data contain
information about the employee’s age, gender, tenure, education, job assign-
ment, and wages. The observations with missing information (mainly caused
by lacking information on education) are deleted, which leaves us with a sam-
ple of 488,282 observations. This is the sample used in the analysis below.
   Mean 
(standard deviation)
 
 Age  39.532 
(8.946) 
 Tenure  7.796 
(7.266) 
 Gender (woman = 1)  0.550 
 
 Education (high = 1)  0.348 
 
   
 Observations  488,282 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 1997-2003.
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The ﬁrm employs 55
percent women and the average employee is 40 years old. These individu-
als have on average 8 years of tenure. The ﬁrm is operating in a segment
where product development is crucial for survival. This implies that a large
proportion of the employees are engaged directly in research. In addition,
the production process is highly automated, and in order to meet the strict
requirements of the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) product testing
2We only consider permanent full-time employment in this analysis which corresponds
to 91.76 percent of the individuals employed. In addition, the executive management
(CEO, executive vice presidents and senior vice presidents) is excluded due to lack of
information on the compensation package for these individuals. Including these individ-
uals in the analysis would only have strengthend our conclusions. For recent surveys on
executive compensation, see Murphy (1999) and Hall and Murphy (2003).
11is an essential part of production. This explains the high education level
in the ﬁrm where 35 percent of the ﬁrm’s employees have a college degree
or above. In the sequel, we term individuals with education levels below a
college degree as low-educated and the remaining part as highly-educated.
A preliminary look at the (real) income structure in the ﬁrm reveals some
interesting features. Table 2 shows the average income and the relative size
of the four subgroups: low-educated non-management, highly-educated non-
management, low-educated management, and highly-educated management.
As expected, income increases with education level and rank. Furthermore,
it can be seen that all four groups experience real income progression over
the 7-year period, but the growth rates diﬀer substantially across groups.
Most pronounced is the 25 percent income growth for low-educated employees
in management. In contrast, income only increases by 4 percent for low-
educated employees in non-management. Similar tendencies can be seen
for highly educated individuals. These preliminary results indicate that the
income gap between management and non-management employees increased
substantially over the period.
   Employee subgroup 
 


































































         
Real income 
growth 1997-2003 
3.75%  3.00%  25.37%  8.80% 
         
# observations  317,234  150,425  1,102  19,521 
 
Tabel 2: Real income progression, 1997 to 2003.
125 Income Inequality
In this section, we investigate how income inequality has changed between
1997 and 2003. The technological shocks causing the income distribution
to change are identiﬁed by estimating (9). The empirical evidence shows
that both general technological progress (i.e. t increases) and management-
biased technological progress (i.e. µ2,µ3 increase) are empirically important
but skill-biased technological change plays an insigniﬁcant role. It is also the
case that while general technological progress shift the income distribution to
the right, the increase in income inequality is due only to management-biased
technological progress. These changes imply that all workers experience real
income progression of 1.2 percent and that the management premium in-
creases by as much as 8 percent.
5.1 Empirical Analysis
The results from estimation of (9) are presented in Table 3. In the ﬁrst
model, only education-rank categories are included. The point-estimate of
µ∗
1 is 0.32 which implies that the estimated productivity diﬀerential between
low- and highly-educated employees in non-management is 32 percent. The
point-estimates for µ∗
2 and µ∗
3 reveal productivity diﬀerentials between low-
educated in non-management and low- and highly-educated employees in
management of 56 percent and 79 percent, respectively. Adding further in-
formation to the model, i.e. including time dummies and demographic and
tenure variables, reduces the point-estimates of µ∗
2 and µ∗
3 slightly but overall
the highly signiﬁcant productivity diﬀerentials persist.
The models presented in Table 3 estimate the average productivity dif-
ferentials. To assess the importance of changes in relative productivity over
time for the income distribution, a model similar to Model 3 in Table 3 is
estimated for the two years 1997 and 2003. The point estimates from these
regressions are used together with the characteristics of the workforce in 1997
to predict the wages for the two years. The 1997 workforce characteristics are
used in both predictions to avoid employee composition eﬀects. This reveals
that the standard deviation of the predicted income distributions increases
from 0.22 to 0.25 between the two years; a result that is shown in Figure 2
where kernels for the two predicted distributions are presented. This docu-
ments that the income distribution is aﬀected signiﬁcantly by the changes in

















Figure 2: Predicted income distributions for 1997 and 2003.
   (1)
  (2)
  (3) 
Low-educated in  
Non-management 
 


































       
Demographic and 
tenure variables 
NO  NO  YES 
Time dummies  NO  YES  YES 
       
R-squared  0.316  0.317  0.398 
Note: Standard errors are clustered with respect to individuals. The demographic and tenure variables used 
in the regression are: gender, age, age squared, tenure and tenure squared. 

































































































































































µ1*: highly-educated in non-management µ2*: low-educated in management
µ3*: highly-educated in management t: general productivity growth (right axis)
Figure 3: Changes in general and relative productivity
To fully accommodate the shifts in the parameters, we estimate a model
which includes dummies for belonging to a particular employee subgroup,
time dummies and interaction terms between employee subgroup and time
dummies. The results of this estimation are presented in Figure 3.3 First,
the general productivity level is increasing for all employee subgroups from
1997 and up to 2001 and declining thereafter (i.e. t increases until 2001).
This implies that the general productivity level in 2003 is at the same level
as in 2000. Over the period, the general productivity level increases with
1.2 percent. The development in relative productivity can also be read from
Figure 3. µ1 (the relative productivity between highly- and low-educated
employees in non-management) has increased by 1.4 percent. This change
is small compared to the increasing diﬀerences between non-management
and management workers. µ3 (the diﬀerential between highly-educated in
management and low-educated in non-management) is altered by 8 percent
and the increase in µ2 (the diﬀerential between low-educated in management
and non-management) is as high as 23 percent.
The results show clear evidence of technological progress due to the signif-
icant increase in the parameter t. In addition, they show that the relative pro-
3The regression is presented in the Appendix.
15ductivity across employees is altered. Productivity progression has been par-
ticularly strong for management employees (both highly- and low-educated)
but also the productivity of highly-educated workers in non-management
has increased relatively to low-educated in non-management. These results
indicate that both skill- and management-biased technological progress are
potentially important.
To shed more light on the relative importance of skill- and management-
biased technological change, we estimate an additional set of regressions. In
the ﬁrst model presented in Table 4, dummies for having a high education
and being a manager are included. Highly educated are estimated to be 33
percent more productive than low-educated and managers are estimated to
produce 40 percent more than non-managers. In Model 2, the change over
time in the education dummy is identiﬁed by adding interaction terms be-
tween being highly educated and time dummies. The results show an increase
of 2 percent. When a similar regression is estimated for the changes in the
management dummy, it reveals a substantial increase of 8 percent. Finally,
in Model 4 the changes over time in both dummies are estimated simultane-
ously. The results show that the growth in the education dummy becomes
insigniﬁcant, while the growth in the management dummy remains high and
at a level of 8 percent. Thus, conditional on the relative changes occurring
between management and non-management employees the productivity gap
due to education remains constant. Unconditionally, however, the education
productivity gap is increasing, but this only reﬂects that employees with
higher educations have a higher representation in management and for that
reason are more likely to capture the increasing management productivity.
In sum, the empirical analysis reveals that management-biased techno-
logical change and technological progress are important whereas skill-biased
technological change plays an insigniﬁcant role. The implications for the
income distribution are twofold. First, technological progress increases the
overall income level and thus shifts the income distribution right. Second,
management-biased technological progress increases the management pre-
mium which moves the upper tail of the distribution further to the right.
This leads to the conclusion that the increased income inequality observed
in the ﬁrm is due to rapid growth in the relative income of management
employees caused by management-biased technological progress.
16   Model (1)
  Model (2)
  Model (3)
  Model (4)
 
Constant  9.075 (0.092)  9.079 (0.091)  9.077 (0.092)  9.079 (0.091) 
Low education  -  -  -  - 
High education 
(HE) 
0.325 (0.006)  0.312 (0.006)  0.325 (0.006)  0.318 (0.006) 
Non-management  -  -  -  - 
Management (M)  0.395 (0.010)  0.395 (0.010)  0.340 (0.013)  0.344 (0.013) 
         
HE*1998    0.008 (0.003)    0.003 (0.003) 
HE*1999    0.015 (0.004)    0.012 (0.005) 
HE*2000    0.026 (0.005)    0.021 (0.005) 
HE*2001    0.015 (0.008)    0.011 (0.008) 
HE*2002    -0.002 (0.012)    -0.011 (0.014) 
HE*2003    0.022 (0.009)    0.013 (0.009) 
M*1998      0.042 (0.006)  0.040 (0.007) 
M*1999      0.032 (0.011)  0.025 (0.011) 
M*2000      0.051 (0.013)  0.038 (0.014) 
M*2001      0.072 (0.014)  0.066 (0.016) 
M*2002      0.073 (0.015)  0.080 (0.019) 
M*2003      0.084 (0.014)  0.076 (0.016) 
         
R-squared  0.389  0.389  0.389  0.390 
Note: Standard errors are clustered with respect to individuals. Year dummies are used in all regressions and 
the demographic and tenure variables are: gender, age, age squared, tenure and tenure squared. 
Table 4: Mincer wage regressions.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to link the rapid growth in management
compensation to the increasing income inequality observed in most developed
countries. Our analysis shows that changes in management compensation
generate income distribution dynamics at the ﬁrm level which mimics those
observed at the market level. In particular, rising management compensation
increases income inequality overall and produces higher within- and between-
education group inequalities.
It is an interesting ﬁnding that the increasing inequality between educa-
tion groups is a consequence of rapid growth in management productivity
and not because of changes related to education per se. This ﬁnding should
attract the attention of education economists and stimulate further research
on the eﬀect of ﬁrm structure on the returns to education.
The results presented in this paper have important policy implications
beyond those traditionally discussed when income inequality is rising. The
reason is that women traditionally have a low representation in management,
see Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2003). Consequently, when increasing
17income inequality is driven by rapid growth in management compensation,
the earnings gap between men and women widens. Thus, although it is an
open question (to an economist) whether rising income inequality is good or
bad, rising income inequality driven by growing management compensation
has the negative side eﬀect of increasing gender diﬀerences.
Finally, our analysis emphasizes the importance of understanding the
internal workings of a ﬁrm when studying the changes in the income distri-
bution. The main reason is that the structure of the ﬁrm, i.e. the division
into a management and a non-management sector, produces a gap in earn-
ings due to the management premium which is unexplained in conventional
studies of the income distribution. We show by modeling the ﬁrm structure
explicitly, that a large part of the (otherwise) unexplained income dispersion
can be contributed to the allocation of employees across hierarchical levels.
Thus, the present study emphasizes that a deeper understanding of the inter-
nal ﬁrm processes helps to advance our understanding of income distribution
dynamics.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We derive the diﬀerent wages of each type of workers in diﬀerent
jobs. Consider ﬁrst the wage of a low-educated worker employed in non-
management. Using equation (6), we can rewrite the payoﬀ of as
WLN =
wLN + sEL + pLMWLM
r + s + pLM
. (12)
19Similarly, using equation (8) the disagreement payoﬀ of a low-skilled worker
bargaining for a non-management job is
DLN =
sEL + pLMWLM
r + s + pLM
. (13)
The expected proﬁt fromrecruiting a low-skilled workerto a non-management
job is given by equation (2). This can be rewritten as
JLN =
yLN − wLN
r + s + pLM
. (14)
The Nash bargaining rule is given by
(1 − β)(WLN − DLN) = βJLN. (15)









r + s + pLM
￿
.
Simplifying this expression gives
wLN = βyLN = βy. (16)
Using similar arguments, we obtain
wLM = βyLN = βµ1y, (17)
wHN = βyHN, = βµ2y, (18)
wHM = βyHM = βµ3y. (19)
7.2 Appendix 2: Deriving the steady state conditions
Proof. We ﬁrst derive the steady state conditions, which equate the ﬂow
of workers into a given job to the ﬂow of workers out of that state. For
low-educated workers the ﬂows in and out of non-management are
pNeL = (s + pLM)iLN, (20)
and the ﬂows in and out of management are
pLM(eL + iLN) = siLN. (21)
20Similarly, forhighly-educated employees the ﬂows related to non-management
job are
pNeH = (s + pHM)iHN. (22)
Finally, the steady state condition for the ﬂows of highly-educated workers
in and out of management can be written as
pHM(eH + iHN) = siHM. (23)
Since,
iLN + iLM + eL = π, (24)
the following equations can be derived from (20), (21) and (24)
eL =
sπ








(s + pLM + pN)(s + pLM)
.
In a similar fashion
eH =
s(1 − π)








(s + pHM + pN)(s + pHM)
.
7.3 Appendix 3: Solving for the steady state probabil-
ities
Proof. Applying the free-entry condition rVHM = rVLM = rVN = 0 and


























It then follows that
vHM = (eH + iHN)θ
α
HM.














vLM = (eL + iLN)θ
α
LM. (31)
From (2), (16), and (18) we derive
JLN =
(1 − β)y
r + s + pLM
, JHN =
(1 − β)µ1y
r + s + pHM
.
Using (25) and (26), we can compute
eL + eH =
s[π(pHM − pLM) + pLM + s + pN]






(1 − π)(s + pLM + pN)





π(s + pHM + pN)
π(pHM − pLM) + pLM + s + pN
















































This can be expressed as
pN =
￿
π(s + pHM + pN) + (1 − π)(s + pLM + pN)µ1





















We see that (32) can be rewritten as
G(pN;α,µ1,µ2,µ3,β,r,s,y,π,cN,cLM,cHM) = 0,




π(s + pHM + pN) + (1 − π)(s + pLM + pN)µ1










To solve for pN, we apply the implicit function theorem. To do so, we need
to show that Gpn ￿= 0 in the steady state. We ﬁrst compute
Gpn = 1 − gpN.













v(s,pHM,pLM,pN,π) = π(pHM − pLM) + pLM + s + pN,
u(s,pHM,pLM,pN,µ1,π) = π(s + pHM + pN) + (1 − π)(s + pLM + pN)µ1,
h(π,µ1,pHM,pLM) = π(1 − π)(µ1 − 1)(pHM − pLM).
Lemma 2 Gpn > 0, for all α ∈ (0,1).
















































[π(pHM − pLM) + pLM + s + pN]
2 > [π(pHM − pLM)]
2 .



















1−α (1 − π)(µ1 − 1)
π(pHM − pLM)
=
(1 − π)(µ1 − 1)pLM
π(pHM − pLM)
,







It then follows that gpN < 1 if and only if (1−π)(µ1−1)pLM < π(pHM−pLM).
Since we have assumed that µ1 < 2, this inequality is always satisﬁed if










and consequently we have Gpn > 0.
A direct consequence of Lemma 2 is
Gpn = 1 − gpN(pN) > 0
Hence we can apply the implicit function theorem to get
pN = f(α,µ1,µ2,µ3,β,r,s,y,π,cN,cLM,cHM).
This completes the derivations of the probabilities in the steady state.
257.4 Additional Regressions
   Linear regression
 
Constant  9.079 (0.091) 
Low-educated in non- 
management (LNM) 
- 
Highly-educated in non- 
management (HNM) 
0.318 (0.007) 
Low-educated in  
management (LM) 
0.336 (0.061) 
Highly-educated in  
management (HM) 
0.662 (0.013) 
Year1997  - 
Year1998  0.008 (0.001) 
Year1999  0.008 (0.002) 
Year2000  0.013 (0.002) 
Year2001  0.018 (0.004) 
Year2002  0.014 (0.006) 
Year2003  0.012 (0.005) 
   
HNM*1998  0.004 (0.003) 
HNM*1999  0.013 (0.005) 
HNM*2000  0.023 (0.006) 
HNM*2001  0.012 (0.008) 
HNM*2002  -0.010 (0.014) 
HNM*2003  0.014 (0.009) 
LM*1998  0.122 (0.024) 
LM*1999  0.124 (0.029) 
LM*2000  0.118 (0.046) 
LM*2001  0.179 (0.061) 
LM*2002  0.192 (0.079) 
LM*2003  0.227 (0.081) 
HM*1998  0.039 (0.007) 
HM*1999  0.032 (0.011) 
HM*2000  0.055 (0.014) 
HM*2001  0.070 (0.014) 
HM*2002  0.063 (0.015) 
HM*2003  0.081 (0.015) 
   
R-squared  0.390 
Note:  Standard  errors  are  clustered  with  respect  to 
individuals. Control variables are: gender, age, age squared, 
tenure and tenure squared. 
Table A1. Mincer wage regression.
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